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Manchus: A Horse of a Different Color 
 
by Hannah Knight 
 
 
Abstract: The question of identity has been one of the biggest 
questions addressed to humanity. Whether in terms of a country, a 
group or an individual, the exact definition is almost as difficult to 
answer as to what constitutes a group. The Manchus, an ethnic 
group in China, also faced this dilemma. It was an issue that lasted 
throughout their entire time as rulers of the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911) and thereafter. Though the guidelines and group 
characteristics changed throughout that period one aspect 
remained clear: they did not sinicize with the Chinese Culture. At 
the beginning of their rule, the Manchus implemented changes that 
would transform the appearance of China, bringing it closer to the 
identity that the world recognizes today. In the course of 
examining three time periods, 1644, 1911, and the 1930’s, this 
paper looks at the significant events of the period, the changing 
aspects, and the Manchus and the Qing Imperial Court’s relations 
with their greater Han Chinese subjects. The Manchus were 
considered, at least to its newly conquered subjects, to be the 
foreign (or more commonly used) “alien” force. Outnumbered, the 
Manchus had every opportunity to assimilate, classifying 
themselves as “Chinese” rather than the standard “Banner” or 
Manchu. However, as this paper will exhibit through the very 
definition of who the Manchus were, and the events that 
surrounded them, as well as their poor relations with their non-
banner subjects, the Manchus remained separated from the Han 
Chinese, continuously classifying themselves as Manchu until their 
official recognition in 1949. 
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Introduction 
 
China is only for the Chinese. If this remark was made sixty years 
ago, many would have agreed with this statement and moved on. 
Upon recent discovery, this was not always the case. In 1949, the 
Manchu identity officially became recognized as a minority ethnic 
group (shaoshu minzu) within the People’s Republic of China. 
Four years later, over two million registered as Manchus.1 Prior to 
this event, many Manchus were thought to have either assimilated 
into the majority Han Chinese culture during the Qing Dynasty 
(1644-1911) or blended together with Japanese culture during the 
Manchukuo period (1931-1945). Either way, the Manchus were a 
small forgotten group among the majority. However, the Manchus 
were a separate group with their own unique identity. This paper 
will explore and map this identity throughout the course of the 
Qing Dynasty and part of the Manchukuo period.2 
  By looking at three distinctive time periods in Manchu 
History, (1644, 1911, and the 1930’s), this paper shows examples 
of how, despite previously thought, the Manchu identity has never 
disappeared, though it was given the opportunity. These chances 
came in many forms as the small ethnic group from Manchuria 
took over the large Han Chinese Culture of the Ming Dynasty, 
faced European competition that presented the ruling ethnic group 
in a poor light, a revolution whose goal was the elimination of the 
Manchus, to finally face a controlling foreign government. There 
were many chances for the Manchus to disappear, yet they 
endured. Not only is it seen by the cultural traits that continued but 
in the relationship with their conquered Han Chinese, or as this 
paper will refer to them as the Han. If the Manchu identity 
changed, it evolved to resemble a more modern identity, not a 
Chinese one. So long as the Manchus claimed their identity, they 
had not disappeared.  
                                                
1 Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in 
Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 42-43. 
2 Throughout the course of the paper, Han will be interchangeably used with 
Chinese and Manchu with Qing or banner people. 
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Beginning: 1644 
 
Before one can begin to see the evolution of the Manchus, one 
must start at the beginning. There are often two sides to the process 
by which a nation is formed. The first side offers a story based on 
vast imagination, involving impressive tales of heroism and 
mystical elements. The other side is commonly backed by tangible 
evidence, which can be traced and checked. The origins of the 
Manchu nation are no different. The mythical aspect tells the story 
of three maidens who one day decide to descend from heaven in 
order to bathe at a lake that lays at the foot of Mt. Bukuri. The 
youngest of the three discovers a fruit placed on her clothing by a 
heavenly messenger. Accidentally swallowing the fruit, the maiden 
becomes pregnant and human, and gives birth to a son. When 
asked his identity, the son claimed that his clan “descended from 
heaven, is the Aisin Gioro. I have no father. My mother was the 
third of heaven’s daughters… I was also a spirit of heaven above.”3 
The son was said to have later become leader of the Jurchens, the 
forerunners of the Manchus. His descendants would come to live 
in the place where the Manchus’ first leader, Nurhaci emerged.4 
For all of its glory and captivating storytelling, this narrative 
remains a myth. 
The myth of the Manchus’ origins not only served to 
entertain, but to also claim ethnic authenticity for the nation. The 
tale may be fictional, but the places and people involved are not. 
Manchus who laid claim to the title of emperor also claimed 
themselves to be descendants of the Aisin Gioro clan. The claim of 
being Aisin Gioro connected one to the beginning of the Manchus 
as well as to claiming favor from the heavens. Ethnic authenticity 
is shown in name, but also location. The Odoli where the son’s 
leadership was established was the same Odoli where Nurhaci rose 
to power.5 A claim to the birthplace of the Manchus not only 
brought ethnic authenticity but established the nation’s legitimacy 
                                                
3 Ibid., 44-46. 
4 Ibid., 46. 
5 Ibid. 
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as a separate ethnic group. Odoli was already recognized as part of 
the Jurchen history (rulers of the Jin Dynasty). This established 
geographical legitimacy. What is more is the boy’s way of 
conception was his claim to his lineage of being from heaven. The 
idea of heaven was very important in the Asian culture, just as was 
Confucian belief of the Mandate of Heaven. The Mandate of 
Heaven is the belief that so long as the emperor was able to 
maintain the well being of a nation, the right to rule was his. For 
the Manchus, the ability to claim ties of such high elevation gave 
the Manchu rulers the legitimacy they needed to rule. 
 Myths hold their own importance in history, yet they are 
often quickly dismissed in favor of facts that can be proven. The 
factual side of the Manchus origins begins with several tribes 
rather than a single nation. Manchuria (the Northeastern Three 
Provinces of modern day China), often fell into the hands of 
foreign forces. Eventually the people of Manchuria would develop 
into three main clans. Of these three, the main line of the Manchus 
connects to a Tungus border tribe, known as the Ju-chens or 
Jurchens.6 These tribes, as well as the neighboring territories, were 
controlled by a feudal system. Though the feudal system had long 
been in place, it left much to desire in the ability to control the 
tribes. The weakening of the surrounding tribes left the opportunity 
for one to assert his power and to get rid of the feudal system in the 
process. That individual was Nurhaci (1559-1626). Inheriting the 
tribal chief position of his own clan upon the death his father, 
Nurhaci used his power to gain control over the rest of the tribes.7 
How Nurhaci went from inheriting the rule over one tribe to the 
formation of a nation lies in the decline the Haixi-Jianzhou 
alliance, an alliance formed by Nurhaci’s Jianzhou Jurchen clan 
and the Haixi tribes.8 The weakening of the tribes allowed Nurhaci 
to seize the opportunity to assert his leadership over all the tribes in 
                                                
6 Franz Michael, The Origin of Manchu Rule in China: Frontier and 
Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire (New York: Octagon 
Books, 1972), 23. 
7 Ibid., 51. 
8 Elliott, The Manchu Way, 54. 
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the alliance.9 While the unification of the tribes began in the late 
sixteenth century, a united Manchu regime did not fully appear 
until 1616 when “Nurhaci proclaimed his regime as the Latter 
Jin.”10 Nurhaci united the tribes, revealing his intentions when he 
took the title of Khan. By claiming the title of Khan, Nurhaci 
revealed his desire for imperial power.11 Nurhaci’s proclamation 
was all he needed to convey his goal of expansion. However, 
Nurhaci did not merely state his intensions. As soon as the 
Manchurian tribes were brought under his control, Nurhaci moved 
into China, bringing about the fall of the Ming, (which had lasted 
from 1368 to 1644), leading to the rise of the Qing, in 1644.  
 Nurhaci may have been seen as the founding father of the 
great Manchu nation, but its true strength did not blossom until the 
rule of Hong Taiji (1592-1643). To further unite the tribes and gain 
additional control, Hong Taiji followed the example of the 
Chinese. Chinese dynasties were known to rule from the Dragon 
Throne, through a complex and extensive bureaucratic network of 
scholar-officials. Hong moved the Manchus away from the feudal 
system to a bureaucratic system based on the Ming political 
structure.12 Hong’s goal was not to remodel the image of the 
Manchus in favor of the Chinese but gain a more centralized 
control over the Manchus. A bureaucratic government gave Hong 
Taiji the power to challenge the Ming. Unfortunately, the Ming 
Emperor failed to see the level of threat the Manchus poised. As 
Franz Michael points out, “in a letter of the Ming Emperor to 
Chinese frontier officials the statement was made that the Manchus 
were originally dependent; but their present status remained open. 
They were simply rebels.”13 According to the Ming, the Manchus 
were just another group of Chinese rebels. What they failed to 
notice was that the Manchus were a “horse of a different color.” 
                                                
9 Ibid., 56. 
10 William Rowe, China's Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 15. 
11 Michael, 51. 
12 Rowe, 17. 
13 Michael, 100. 
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 The Ming may have seen nothing more than a group of 
rebels, but there were several ethnic traits that separated the 
Manchus and the Han, which established the Manchu identity; the 
first of these being their name. In 1635 the former Jurchen tribes 
dropped all ties to their tribal past and used the term “Manchu” to 
identify themselves.14 Some, such as Dorgon, the regent for the 
Shunzhi emperor in 1644, believed “the empire is a single whole. 
There are no distinctions between Manchus and Hans.”15 In reality, 
it would be the differences between the Manchus and the Han that 
would serve as a source of tension between the two groups. 
Moving beyond their history and name, religion also became a 
point of difference and a point of identity. Buddhism, Daoism, 
Shamanism and to some extent, Confucianism came to be the 
belief systems of China. Buddhism, Daoism, and especially 
Confucianism were the religious systems of the Han Chinese and 
were adopted. Yet shamanism remained the leading religion 
among the Manchus.16 The religious leaders, shamans, were 
individuals of unnatural ability, who were responsible for the 
communication with spirits. Out of the two forms of shamanism, 
primitive and domestic, the large majority of Manchus focused on 
the domestic practice. Domestic shamanism was “liturgically based 
sacrifices made to heaven and to the ancestors…”17 Shamanism 
held elements, such as the ancestral, patrilineal sacrifices, that 
closely resembled Confucian practices, which made the 
introduction of shamanism into the Chinese culture easier. 
Shamanism most importantly, provided a unity amongst the 
Manchus with a belief system as its center. “We Manchus have our 
own particular rites for honoring heaven.”18 The Yongzheng 
emperor made it clear in the previous statement that all cultures 
honor the heavens, but the Manchu nation had its own way. Its 
similarity to the other religions had made its introduction into 
                                                
14 Elliott, 63. 
15 Ibid., 212. 
16 Ibid., 235. 
17 Ibid., 236. 
18 Ibid., 241. 
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Chinese culture easier. Shamanism, however, also showed the 
differences between the Han and the Manchus; this would 
ultimately create a barrier between the two.19 
 Religion was only a small factor in which the Manchus 
sought to establish their identity and distinction from others. A 
written script was also created to further strengthen their identity. 
Manchu dialect had long been established, yet script was one area 
in which it had not fully developed. “The Chinese write their own 
speech, the Mongols write their own speech. Are you telling me 
that it is better for us all to continue learning and writing a foreign 
language than for you to find a way for us to write our own?”20 
Extreme as they were, Nurhaci’s remarks served to enforce the 
need to establish their own written script in order to dominate over 
China. By mixing a Mongolian script with their own language, the 
Manchus provided credibility to their identity as an ethnic group. 
The Manchus now had a tool which marked their place in history 
and acted as a means of communication. A written script became 
an important part of the Manchu identity where deaths, weddings, 
and names could be recorded.  
Names also served as both an identifying and separating 
factor especially with name changing. “The Emperor: You are a 
Hanjun. Why do you have a Manchu name? Arsai: My original 
name was Cui Zhilu. Since the time I was small, I have studied the 
Qing language [i.e., Manchu], and so I took a Manchu name.”21 
Name and language were often used to identify ones ethnicity. The 
problem for this defendant was that he was commonly mistaken as 
a Manchu, instead of Chinese, due to his ability to speak the 
Manchu language and the origin of his name. Chinese and Manchu 
names differed in a myriad of ways. Chinese surnames are 
normally single character. Their given names are one to two 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Pamela Crossley, The Manchus (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002). Kindle 
ed Chapter 2, Loc 550. 
21 Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F Siu, and Donald S Sutton, Empire at the 
Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press Berkeley, 2006), 27. 
 
Hannah Knight 
 
 
85 
characters. In contrast, the Manchu names are longer than the two 
syllable names of Chinese. A Chinese name may look along the 
lines of “Wang Fuzhi,” whereas Manchu names resembled 
something more like “Niu-gu-lu E-bi-long.” In greeting, the 
Chinese used their surnames as identification, paying homage to 
their familial ties. Manchus, however, identified themselves not by 
their familial ties but by their banner affiliation.22 For Manchus, 
names were nothing more than a syllable to be recorded for later 
reference. Their main concern was representing the sounds of the 
Manchu language. To hold on to a true representation of the 
Manchu language, names used appearance, character, and even 
numbers.23 The ease of naming practices was not one enjoyed by 
the Han. Han names were fraught with meaning.24 Burdened by the 
belief that naming was tied directly to fate, words such as “sickly” 
or “weak” would not be found in Chinese names. Names were an 
important first step in a person’s life that professionals were often 
consulted. For the Han, every detail in regards to the naming 
process was taken into consideration, so much so that Han Chinese 
of the same generation would use common names, a process which 
the Manchus paid little mind to.25 There were cases where 
Manchus had Chinese sounding names or Chinese had Manchu 
names. Yet it was a belief that Manchus were to have Manchu 
names and the Han, Chinese names.  
 Intangible characteristics alone did not make up the 
Manchu identity. Physical appearances were also observed, such as 
dress. The most notable stylistic choice for the Manchu was the 
men’s hairstyle. The queue required the men to shave their 
forelocks, leaving only a piece of long, braided hair at the back of 
their head. However, since its introduction into the mass Chinese 
public, it was no longer a clear marker for Manchu ethnicity. The 
women on the other hand, maintained their own identity. Where 
the Manchu men’s hairstyle became one of the masses, the 
                                                
22 Elliott, 241-2. 
23 Ibid., 242-3. 
24 Ibid., 242. 
25 Ibid., 243-4. 
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Manchu women’s became one of distinction. Han women wore a 
simple bun on the top of their head, leaving all décor to a variation 
of headdresses. The Manchu women were the innovators of the use 
of hair extensions. Worn back, the Manchu women would take 
their hair and wrap it around either a wooden, metal, or ivory fillet 
that fastened behind their hair, in an intricate triangle pattern. 
Extending dramatically, the Manchu women would dress their hair 
with flowers or other decorative pieces and earrings that helped set 
the Manchu woman and Han women apart.26 At the appearance 
level, the Manchu women were the examples of separation 
between the two groups as by passing the Queue edict. Manchu 
men had a difficult time standing out from Han or Mongol. 
For the Manchu women, beauty came to reflect in the style 
of their hair. For the Han women, foot binding was a mark of 
beauty. This often led to the painful process of wrapping a 
woman’s, sometimes young girl’s, foot until it turned into the 
smaller, deformed, “beautiful” one. The Manchus did not see small 
feet as a marker of beauty. “[There] were several women, natives 
of Tartary or Tartar extraction, whose feet were not distorted like 
those of the Chinese… The Tartar ladies have hitherto kept their 
legs at liberty, and would never submit to the Chinese operation of 
crippling the feet.”27 Foot binding was frowned upon by the 
Manchu women, who could not see the apparent beauty that came 
with the manipulation of one’s feet. Though an attempt was made 
to ban foot binding, the ban was lifted in 1668 after the Han 
women refused to give up the practice.28  
 For all for the importance of the previously discussed 
identity traits, the most important part to the Manchu culture, in 
terms of identity, was the banner system. The banner system was 
the division of the Manchus into different groups, resembling a 
class structure of. Typically, the top three banners were the upper 
class. From the beginning, the eight banners’ purpose was to 
provide an efficient, quick way of “mobilizing an army” that at the 
                                                
26 Ibid., 250. 
27 Ibid., 246. 
28 Ibid., 247. 
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same time transformed the Jurchen tribes into a unified Jin state, 
moving away from tribal ties to a centralized power.29 Building 
from hunting traditions and tactics, Nurhaci used the quasi-military 
maneuvers of the hunt to practice warfare skills. He also based the 
division of the Jurchen army, on the hunting experience of old.30  
The division of the banners extended beyond the military. 
The Manchus were divided into different groups whose boundaries 
would encompass not only the other males of the household but 
also their wives, children and servants.31 Typically, once the hunt 
was over, one was expected to return to their different regions all 
over the nation, as the units of the hunting parties were temporary. 
The banner organization changed this aspect of the hunt and with 
the division of the groups, the units were to remain in a designated 
area with their families always ready for battle. This factor served 
the Jin well in their goal of conquest. Beginning with four banner 
colors, in 1615 the system evolved into the well-known Eight 
banner system. Twenty years later, when the Manchus began their 
invasion of China, the expansion included all ethnic groups, 
including both the Mongols and the Han.32 The total number of 
banners amounted to twenty-four, yet the eight Manchu banners 
came to be known as the core of the banner system. The beginning 
of the banner system did not allow open enrollment. Even after 
Mongols and Chinese were allowed to join a banner society, it was 
mostly purely Han or Mongol, there was no intermixing. Complete 
integration was rare.33 
 Division between the two ethnic groups came from all 
sides. A relatively large population, the Manchus’ numbers in 
comparison to the Ming failed to compete. Many have adopted the 
Confucius saying that “Only by becoming ‘Chinese’ in their 
political organization had the ‘barbarians’ a chance of conquering 
                                                
29 Ibid., 57. 
30 Ibid., 58. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 59. 
33 Ibid., 73. 
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the rule over China.”34 After the Manchus adopted the Ming 
government system, it would be expected that the Manchus had 
willingly become Chinese or the Chinese had fed their standards to 
the Manchus. This logic fails to recognize the tools of control. The 
Manchus, before the introduction of any government structure, 
were a divided, tribal, and feudal system. With the goal of 
conquest in mind, some form of government was required, which 
led to uniting the Manchus under one political system which in 
turn made the conquest over the Ming easier. Despite the fact a 
new ethnic group was taking control of the country, the adoption of 
the Han Chinese’s bureaucratic government allowed for the daily 
functions of the government to go without interruption. 
Conquest is not only made easier when political structures 
match, but also when the gates are left open. The actions of the 
Ming rulers provided opportunity for any looking to expand their 
territory. During the end of the Ming rule, the Han faced financial 
decline due to the corruption within the court. Officials would not 
only exempt their own property from taxes but would also lend 
money with high interest rates that would allow them to acquire 
more land that would be tax exempt.35 The Ming scholar-gentry 
class worked for themselves by acquiring these lands, not the 
government, whose source of revenues were from the taxes 
collected.36 These were the problems of the Ming government; 
central power was limited and with no ability to tax the land, funds 
were scarce. These were funds that could have potentially been 
used to repair irrigation systems, protect the lands from flooding, 
or to pay for soldiers.  These signs of corrosion within the Ming 
Empire moved beyond the official level. Deterioration seeped 
down into the local level, and upon the recollection of Nanjing’s 
transition, an eyewitness recounted that in the absence of the Ming 
emperor, the palace began to be gutted by the people of Nanjing, 
including the eyewitness’s family: “The good things had all been 
                                                
34 Michael, 3. 
35 Ibid., 6. 
36 Ibid., 72. 
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looted; I got only the satins.”37 Not even the emperor’s parrot was 
safe. The gates were open and the conquest had begun. 
       When the Manchus seized their opportunity and succeeded in 
their goal of defeating the Ming, conquest came in many forms. It 
was more than pillaging, murdering, or battles. Conquest often 
occurred in the lives of the Chinese at a quick pace.38 In the case of 
Nanjing, Qing soldiers quickly replaced the original Ming soldiers. 
For many, the changing of protective forces was cause for concern; 
the Han’s safety was in the hands of foreign forces. Yet no change 
or act of Manchu domination came as great as the hairstyle of 
queue for the men. A mark of identity for the Manchu men, it soon 
became a mark of submission for the Han. At first, only officials 
and the military were forced to change their hair to the Manchu 
style. It was soon confirmed that all males of the Ming Empire 
were to wear the queue and, “anyone who didn’t conform was to 
be killed.”39 For the Han, the opposition against the queue was 
more than a dislike of the hairstyle or its status as a mark of 
submission to the Qing, but a sign of disrespect. The shaving of 
one’s hair was seen as going against the Confucian belief of filial 
piety, or rather the need to honor one’s ancestors. Unfortunately 
for the Han, resistance to the queue made little difference.  
The conquest of the Han Chinese began to change the 
relationship between the Han Chinese and the Manchus. Prior to 
the complete conquest, the Manchus had been Chinese rebels in 
the eyes of the Ming. When the queue was enforced, the Han 
became aware that the Manchus were anything but Chinese. To 
them, any modeling of the Manchu-styled haircut was inhuman, 
much less Chinese.40 It was not only the Han who were quick to 
assume the Manchus were below them in status. The Manchus’ 
low view of the Han was seen in the example of the women who 
were captured in Yangzhou and were brought to Nanjing, who 
                                                
37  Lynn A Struve, Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in Tiger’s 
Jaws, Birmingham (New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1944), 60. 
38 Ibid., 63. 
39 Ibid., 64. 
40 Ibid. 
 
Manchus: A Horse of a Different Color 
 
 
90 
were tethered together, and given a price.41 To the Manchus, the 
Han were objects to be sold or reshaped in an image befitting what 
pleased them. 
 The Manchus were reshaping the Han to look like them, 
especially the men. At the same time, each group maintained their 
separation. Separation only seemed natural to the Manchus and the 
Han. According to one Chinese scholar, Wang Fuzhi, separation 
existed in nature thus it existed in society. “So it is that dew, 
thunder, frost, and snow all occur at their proper times, and 
animals, plants, birds, and fish all keep to their own species. There 
can be no frost or snow during the long summer days, nor can there 
be dew or thunder in the depths of winter.”42 In his own 
philosophical way, Wang commented that to mix the two groups 
together would be going against nature, which was one of two key 
elements to the Chinese culture as a way to maintain order and 
peace. 
        In order to govern an empire as large as China during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, peace was important. The 
purpose of the adoption of some of the Chinese culture, such as the 
political system, was to maintain peace. The hopes of the Manchus 
were not to become assimilated into the Chinese culture, yet the 
image had become an important part to the Manchus as they came 
into power. Hoping to rid their identity of the barbarian stigma, the 
Manchus had adopted the Ming bureaucratic style. The Confucian 
practice of widow chastity was also adopted. By adopting such a 
custom, the Manchus hoped it would work to “publicly 
demonstrate to their Han Chinese subjects their benignity and 
refinement,”43 not to become assimilated into the Han culture. 
Widow chastity was adopted to change the image of the Manchus 
                                                
41 Ibid., 65. 
42 William Theodore De Bary, “Wang Fuzhi” Sources of Chinese Tradition: 
Volume 2: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century: Vol. 2 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 28-9.  
43 Mark C. Elliott, “Manchu Widows and Ethnicity in Qing China,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 41, no. 1 (Jan. 1999): 34. 
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as well as provided legitimacy to the Manchu rule.44 The Manchus 
were an alien force, whose “crimes” against the Han made the 
acceptance of their rule difficult. Widow chastity helped to ease 
some of the tension between the two and allowed the Han to see 
beyond the perceived Manchu barbarianism. Even more, widow 
chastity served to show, not only the legitimacy of the Manchu 
rulers, but that the Manchu women were just as deserving of grace 
as the Han women.45 The Manchus made it clear that they were on 
the same level, if not higher, to that of the “civilized” Han. The 
adoption of Chinese cultural practices, such as widow chastity, 
made the peace between the two possible. However separation still 
existed. 
As Rana Mitter points out, “the Mandate of Heaven theory 
did not demand that China’s rulers be Chinese, only that they 
accepted the conceptual framework on which the Chinese imperial 
institution rested (cheng) and that they bring all the Chinese under 
one unified rule (t’ung).”46 At the same time as the Manchus were 
bringing all under one unified rule, they were creating barriers 
between themselves and the Han. These barriers would far outlast 
the end of the Qing. Even in the adoption of Chinese practices, 
there was separation. In the case of widow chastity, chastity often 
brought recognition and awards from the imperial court. In turn, 
these awards brought substantial funds to the women and their 
family. However, the division of the awards caused strife among 
the two groups. The number of recipients of the awards tallied up 
to a high number of Manchus. This number far exceeded that of 
the Han recipients.47  
The extreme practice of widow chastity in some cases 
involved suicide. Suicides among these widows were a common 
and well respected practice during the Ming. The Manchus saw it 
                                                
44 Ibid., 38. 
45 Ibid., 39. 
46  Rana Mitter, Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration 
During the Manchurian Crisis, 1931-1933 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000), 18-19. 
47 Elliott, 40-41. 
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as a “lack of respect for life” and a minor reflection on their own 
supposed “barbarian” nature.48 The Qing attempted to stop the 
practice by arguing that it went against Confucianism, masking the 
real motivation of their desire to separate themselves from the 
barbarian stigma.49 Even with the disapproval of the Qing court, 
the Han and the Manchu women continued the practice of 
“following one into death,” a practice that existed before Chinese 
use. The difference of the Manchu use of the practice was in more 
cases that the wife was not the only one to accompany the man in 
death. Maids, consorts, and even other males followed the 
deceased man into death, as in the case of the Shunzhi emperor.50 
Suicides were not a source of pride or distinction for the Manchus 
as it was for the Han. Suicides were centered more on loyalty and 
death.51  
The acceptance of widow chastity by the banner women 
extended beyond ancestral traditions or the loyalty to one’s 
husband. Financial rewards also played a role. Han widows were 
forced to rely on the family of the deceased husband for support. 
Manchu widows, due to the 1762 edict of the Qianlong emperor, 
received more assistance regardless of their age. Prior to this, 
chastity was only open to those over the age of forty.52 Benefits 
made it appealing for banner women to remain chaste. The benefits 
may have been appealing but the issue of choice also affected 
whether or not widow chastity was practiced. The Han women 
were to practice chastity, willing or not. For the Manchus, at times, 
chastity was never an option. To prevent the abuse of the 
assistance given to them exclusively, thus creating a pressure on 
the National treasury, Manchu widows were commonly forced to 
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remarry. Pressures on the treasury and the population numbers 
became a concern for the Manchus. Already having less than their 
conquered subjects, widow chastity further lessened the 
population. In light of this, Manchu widows under forty were 
forced to remarry to continue the Manchu line.53  
 The Manchu officials, by the adoption of certain policies, 
saw that: “if they publicly embraced the concept of China, such 
acceptance of Han culture would win them the support of the Han 
people.”54 The Manchus had conquered a nation that far 
outnumbered their own. The adoption of some cultural customs, 
such as chastity and the bureaucratic government, served to 
appease the roaring, rebellious voices of the Han. The Manchus 
understood that concession was necessary in order to maintain 
peace. At the same time, they did not wish to discard their own 
cultural differences to conform to become fully Han Chinese. 
Anything of Han Chinese influence that was seen as unnecessary 
to maintain peace was changed.55 It so happened that in the process 
of creating Qing China, the Manchus got rid of most aspects of 
Han China.  
 Among the first changes was the Ming’s geographical 
redefinition of China. Ming China encompassed fifteen provinces 
and the Han Chinese who resided within them. Under the Qing, 
China grew to include the lands of what once was Manchuria, and 
present day Mongolia, Xinjang, Tibet, along with a number of 
other areas.56 The expansion of China’s borders helped stabilize its 
economy and aided the newest residents of China. In stabilizing 
the economy, “the Manchu emperors not only legitimated their 
own rule but also opened the way for the banner armies to conquer 
and incorporate a range of ethnically diverse peoples into the 
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imperium.”57 For as much as the Manchus used traditions, cultural 
practices, or government structures, they were not Chinese, thus 
they were not treated the same way. The Manchus changed the 
social hierarchy.  
 
 
       
 Image of Ming Empire. 58 
 
“They demarcated the whole area north of Tongji Gate and 
Dazhong Bridge and west of the place called Small Camp near 
Gem Pearl Bridge [for exclusive occupation by Qing bannermen], 
and they ordered everyone to move out of the dwellings in that 
area within three days.” 59 Nanjing was only one example of Han 
residents who were moved out of their homes in order to corner off 
a section of cities to accommodate the Manchus. The ability to do 
so exhibited the power the Manchus now had, a power envied by 
the Han. “Upon seeing the Prince of Yu at West Floral Gate, 
Zhang also told his circle that his own ancestors had been Tartars 
and that he still had a portrait of them in Manchu costume in his 
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home, so it was fitting that he shave his head.”60 Though stating 
the reason for the acceptance of the Manchu hairstyle so easily was 
his ancestral connection, in reality Zhang’s willingness to support 
the Manchu side shows the power they had, a power and status 
Zhang hoped to gain. 
Zhang, as well as the other Han subjects, would soon learn 
that “Manchus [were] to be an example for the Han Chinese.” 
Separation between the two would lead to favoritism for one, 
mistreatment for the other.61 The Manchus had adopted the Ming’s 
bureaucratic government. However, banner appointments were not 
subjugated to the law of avoidance as the Chinese appointed 
officials were.62 Law of avoidance kept corruption within a 
government at bay by making it against the rules for an official to 
be posted in his home province or in a neighboring province. In the 
bureaucratic system the Qing had adopted, there was still room for 
change. The Manchus not only could serve within their own 
banners but also benefitted from many opportunities within the 
government and military. The Han, even those of the greatest 
talents, were confined to certain positions within the Chinese 
banners and the government.63 Even those who had joined the 
Manchu side from the very beginning faced the same treatment. 
The once high officials of the Ming became the lowly ones of the 
Qing. “When my father was in the Ming court, was he not the 
exalted Duke of Pingguo? Now that he’s serving the Qing Court, 
how is it that he’s behind others? But it is that way even for those 
who went over to the Qing first.”64  
Favoritism had become another form of separation between 
the Manchus and the Han. Those who served in the banners and as 
banner soldiers were shown considerable amount of favor. Due to 
the amount of hardship and the possibility of death in service, the 
needs of the bannermen were met. Money was given in the form of 
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silver, households wanted for nothing as allowances were given to 
each man to cover the housing and food needs for him and his 
family. Weapons, as well as supplies to care for their horses, were 
also provided. Additional stipends were given to cover any 
financial circumstances; bravery in battle was rewarded with a 
monetary sum.65 Debts, weddings, and funerals were paid for by 
the court; the banner soldiers had become known as the people 
who “ate the emperor’s rice.”66 The costs of such care were taken 
from the imperial treasury. The source of income for the treasury 
was the taxes paid by the Han, who in the meantime were evicted 
from their homes for the Manchus. Even when the Chinese banners 
existed, they did not receive quite the same treatment and for sure 
the regular Han citizens did not.  
        Becoming an official in the imperial court was even more 
rewarding than being a simple bannerman. Salaries and benefits of 
officers, officials of the bannermen, were regularly higher and 
more favorable in comparison to the civilian officials (the Han). 
The route to these official positions required a three part civil 
service examination.  In another cultural practice adopted by the 
Manchus, the Han had the advantage as they were more familiar 
with the texts that were tested upon. However even among the 
Han, who spent years studying, numbers of those that passed at the 
first level, let alone all three, were low. This was the problem that 
presented itself to the Qing court; they had adopted the system 
when they came in to power to appease the Han, but the Manchus 
themselves were not scholars. Out of the 108 first-place honors, 
only one was given to a bannerman, who was not even a Manchu 
but a Mongol.67 For the Manchu officials, the question that arose 
was how to guarantee that Manchus would pass so that they would 
be able to hold posts within the imperial court? To solve this 
dilemma, the Manchus set up many methods to guarantee the 
acquisition of a government position was made easier for a 
bannerman. One method was by “imposing a quota of successful 
                                                
65 Elliott, 195. 
66 Ibid., 191-2, 195. 
67 Ibid., 203. 
 
Hannah Knight 
 
 
97 
banner candidates, so that the examination standard was, so to 
speak, on a ‘curve.’”68 Not trusting one method to guarantee the 
Manchus would dominate the official positions, the examination 
was easier for the banner soldiers, sometimes only requiring 
translations between Manchu and Chinese. The Manchus had the 
highest success rate of other ethnic group, including the Han. 
Again such favorable treatment was focused only on the Manchus, 
not the Han.69  
       There was only one route to a government position for the 
Han, the examination system. The Manchus were not as 
unfortunate. Bannermen also had the option to work their way 
through the banner hierarchy, by creating successful careers within 
the military, or were awarded government positions. A bannerman 
could acquire a position in the government by either creating both 
a successful career and working his way through the Banner 
hierarchy or by being awarded for impressive performance in 
battle with a high position. Either method was accomplished 
without a degree or ever taking the examination. “And when have 
we ever relied on people who came up through the military 
examinations? Would we place our leadership and trust in 
them?”70 Other bannermen relied on family connections as did 
Agui, whose father, Akdun, an important official, gave him a 
position as a secretary.71 Family connections were often the 
footholds to the life as an imperial official. As Evelyn Rawski 
points out, “the Qianlong Emperor frequently appointed banner 
nobles who were linked to him through marriage to the Grand 
Council: the number of Manchus on the Grand Council exceeded 
Chinese in 73 percent of the sixty years of his reign.”72 The 
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methods opened to the Manchu bannermen were not opened to all. 
The Han did not have these same options and instead had to look 
for other positions. 
       While the bannermen dominated the government positions, the 
Han attempted to hold some presence in government. Most of the 
imperial positions that were held by the Han Chinese were local 
level positions, such as the magistrate. The magistrates oversaw 
the grievances of a number of towns. The magistrate could act as 
judge and jury, except when it came to legal cases concerning the 
Manchus. Any crime committed by a bannerman, even 
premeditated murder, could only be handled by the magistrate to 
the point of discovery. They were then required to hand the case to 
local banner authorities to be dealt with.73 It did not stop there. 
Torture could not be used on bannermen in interrogations, they 
were held in their own prisons, and made it difficult for civilians 
(the Han) to bring charges against them as they held immunity 
from the regular prosecution ordinance. “[S]o there is no way to 
enforce the law inside the Manchu city.”74 Even when measures 
were taken to enforce the charges, the punishment was left to 
garrison commanders. It was mandatory for punishments to be 
lessened for all bannermen.75 Manchus were above the law and 
above the Han. They kept themselves separate at all times, even 
within their banner organization, separating the Chinese banners 
from the Mongols. Even though they could claim to part of the 
banner system, they received less than their Manchu counter-
parts.76 
 The favoritism shown to the Manchus as well as signs of 
Han submission had come to resemble a form of conquest. The 
conquest of the Ming had come in to form of hair, social 
demographics, and ultimately separation. It also came in the form 
of death and destruction. By the time the conquest was over, many 
of Han descent shared the feelings of Shi Kefa, whose last diary 
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entry read: “To repay the nation with this one death is surely my 
destiny. I only regret not having earlier followed our former 
emperor to the grave…In a world like this, life is of no use 
anyway; one might as well come to this conclusion early on.”77 
What preceded this feeling of despair was a story of mass 
pillaging, rape, and murder as the city of Yangzhou fell. A survivor 
of the event, Wang Xiuchu, describes a scene of chaos as “the men 
guarding the wall came down, making a commotion, and scurried 
for cover, throwing off their helmets and spears, some even 
cracking their heads or spraining their ankles.”78 In fear of what 
was to come, the city was left open, undefended, and ready for the 
invaders to enter.  
 The soldiers fled, leaving the citizens to face the Manchus. 
As stated by Wang, those left in the city attempted to welcome the 
Qing troops and burned incense “to show they dared not resist.”79 
Many believed that peace could be reached between the two 
groups. Others, such as Wang, realized that the Manchus had not 
come for just their lands. Those who realized this turned to their 
wives and other female relatives to say: “Enemy soldiers have 
entered the city. If things go awry, you should cut short your own 
life.”80 Wang’s wife response was that of appealingly logical, 
saddened mindset, “Women like me in situations like this no 
longer think to live in the human world.”81 To die appeared to the 
better option than to be conquered by the Manchus. Bribes of silver 
or any other wealth delayed any acts against the Han but it could 
not delay the evitable. “The sounds of lamentation and pain outside 
struck terror from the ears to the soul.”82 To maximize the 
destruction, the Qing set the city on fire and issued false promises 
to spare any who did not resist. Crowds gathered in the squares 
under the protection of these false promises where true terror 
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began. Women were tied together at the neck, babies were left on 
the ground, where trampled victims’ organs began to blend in with 
the mud, and dead bodies decorated the streets.83 The days of 
killing began to number and extermination appeared to be 
evident.84 The feelings of resentment began to build. “Before my 
eyes I seemed to see countless souls [Buddhist] guardian demons 
driving a million souls to their deaths in hell.”85 The Manchus’ 
goal appeared to be mass destruction as was as one soldier 
revealed to Wang. “If I don’t kill you, somebody else is sure to.”86 
By the end of massacre 80,000 had died by the hand of the 
Manchus in Yangzhou.87 
 To repair the damage that events such as Yangzhou had 
caused, the Manchus attempted to change their image. The 
Manchus, aiming to be seen as benefactors than conquerors, started 
with the survivors where the attack was the greatest, i.e. Yangzhou. 
For the survivors, peace came in the form of rice and clothing.88 
The Manchus hoped to portray an image of benevolence, one that 
would be copied. An image they believed would only come across 
up close. At the same time as the Manchus were to be an example 
for the Han, they also forced them into subjugation. After the fall 
of the Ming, a large number of Han had become the slaves of the 
Manchus. Whether through capture or bankruptcy, the Manchus 
believed that while they were slaves, the Han had benefitted. In a 
1723 report, it is said that Han came “to Manchu houses, dreaming 
of a place to rest their bodies and not wanting to go hungry, they 
all ask to stay. In this way Manchus also take on slaves [Ma 
aha].”89 By taking them on as slaves, the Manchus were helping 
the Han by providing food and shelter, if they suffered in the 
process, it was rarely reported. The Manchus were the great 
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“providers” of the Qing Dynasty, rather than the murderers of the 
Han.  
 
 
 Image of Yangzhou massacre. 90 
  
The case of Yangzhou served as an example of what 
Manchu rule looked like. It showed the power of the Qing, their 
ideas regarding their relationship with the Han. There is a question 
of whether the mistreatment of the Chinese was more extreme than 
other ethnic groups. The cities that were attacked were not of 
Mongol, or other, ethnicity; the cities were Chinese. At the 
mention of the treatment of the women during this period, one 
soldier made mention that when they had conquered Korea (1627, 
1636-7) they “had captured women by the tens of thousands, and 
not one lost her chastity.”91 The repeated mentioning of rape that 
occurs reveals that the Han women were not treated the same as 
Korean women. The conquest of the Ming empire both helped 
define who the Manchus were and united them as an ethnic group. 
At the same time, the acts of subjugation, violence, favoritism, and 
separation ultimately established the tense relationship between the 
Manchus and the Han. A relationship that would not change for the 
next 276 years, leading to several of China’s key historic events.  
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Change in Power: 1911   
 
In the late nineteenth century, several decades after the Taiping 
Rebellion, the Guangxi Emperor saw the warning signs of a larger 
movement and took action. In 1898, the Guangxi emperor, the lone 
representative of the Manchu side, was joined by many Han 
Chinese reformers. Though many called for the end of Manchu 
design, which would change the social structure, or even the 
elimination of the queue, many believed it was not taking the 
reform movement far enough.92 The goal of the One Hundred Days 
of Reform was to eliminate the differences between the Manchus 
and the Han. To do so, one reformer, Zhang Yuanji, listed six 
reforms that would end the differences in the relations between the 
Han and the Manchus. These six would bring an end to 
administrative separation, social and occupational segregation by 
getting rid of the separate slots for Manchus and Han, and allow 
intermarriage. Zhang also hoped to end the stipends meant for 
banner soldiers and create schools that would work to give 
vocational training to unemployed bannermen. The banner system 
had made it impossible for its members to look outside of the 
military or government for work. Now, even the emperor called for 
the bannermen to move beyond the system.93  
The target of the reforms was the Manchu way of life. 
However, for Liang Qichao, disciple of Kang Youwei, this was not 
the goal.94 Liang Qichao believed there was a need for the races to 
merge together, “only because they had mixed together were they 
able to survive. Meanwhile, numerous other groups had perished 
because they had not intermixed.”95 China was facing increasing 
competition from the Western powers, that they could not win 
divided. Essentially, Liang believed that the superior race, the Han, 
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had a chance at survival. The Manchus, inferior, ran the risk of 
dying out if they did not choose to intermix.  
 
If their oppressive policies continue much longer, 
they will engender a great upheaval, in which 
resolute scholars all over the country will either 
declare independence, as in America, or start a 
revolution, as in France and Spain. By then, of 
course, it will be too late for the Manchus to regret. 
Or if it does not happen like this, then after a few 
more years of today’s reactionary government, there 
will be partition. As partition takes place, the secret 
societies will rise and run amok. Since the 
government’s authority cannot penetrate to the local 
level, the people will have free rein to take their 
revenge. Whatever else might happen, the Manchus 
in the provincial garrisons will surely be 
annihilated. After partition both Han and Manchus 
will be enslaved. But the Han, because they have a 
large population and are not lacking in intelligence, 
will still be able to conspire to join together to 
regain their independence. The Manchus, on the 
other hand, are not only few in number but also 
stupid and weak. Although they will have escaped 
the vengeance of the Han, they will forever serve as 
beasts of burden for the white people. Moreover, 
Han farmers and artisans are industrious and 
frugal…. Consequently, even if the Han territory is 
partitioned, the Han people will still have some 
influence in the world; though subjugated, they will 
survive in the end. The Manchus [on the other hand] 
have for the past two centuries eaten without 
farming and been clothed without weaving. Not one 
among their five million people is capable of being 
a scholar, farmer, artisan, or merchant. When 
partition occurs and their political, financial, and 
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military powers have all fallen into the hands of the 
white race, if they want some food or lodging then, 
will they still get it? Therefore, what the Manchus 
themselves have decided to do is precisely a self-
chosen road to destruction. This truly is an example 
of “quenching one’s thirst by drinking poisoned 
wine.96 
 
Liang sees the Manchus as parasites who would not survive if 
forced to do so on their own. Resentment over current policies and 
past attacks remained just as strong at this point as it did then. 
Should the Manchus wish to prevent any Han uprising, intermixing 
was the only solution according to Liang.  
 For others intermixing was not a solution, as there had 
never been any separation to begin with. A student of Charles 
Darwin, Yan Fu advocated the belief that today’s world features 
many different species. However all of these species came from 
one source. 97 Where Liang pits the Manchus and the Han Chinese 
as two opposing races, Yan Fu sees them not as competitors but 
belonging to the same race, the yellow race. Yan Fu claims that the 
rule of China has never been by an outside force. It is only now 
that the rule of China is threatened by another outside, race, the 
Westerners.98  
Separation or not, either thought did not stop the reforms of 
the 1898 Reform Movement from coming about with great speed. 
As stated earlier, the reforms attacked the Manchus’ way of life yet 
they were supported by the Guangxi Emperor. The emperor was 
the only Manchu to agree with the reforms. Liang was correct in 
assuming that the banner people had no way to support themselves 
outside of the stipends they received. The “preferential treatment” 
such as leniency in legal occurrences or favorable government 
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posts would cease, thus ending the Manchus’ way of life for the 
past two hundred years.99  
As quick as it started, the Hundred Days of Reform was 
brought to an end as the Empress Dowager Cixi placed the 
Guangxi emperor under house arrest. As many of the reformers 
fled from fear of punishment, many of the reforms set forth were 
discarded.100 The Barriers were reinstated and life returned to the 
way as it was. The issue of reform was not revisited until the Boxer 
Rebellion. Imperialism and industrialization during the late 
nineteenth century had pushed Western nations farther into other 
nations, spreading new ideas and increasing pressure on the Qing. 
One of these ideas, Social Darwinism, was the pitting of the “white 
race against the yellow.”101 With the failures of the Opium Wars, 
the Sino-Japanese Wars, and other disputes between China and 
foreign nations, many realized that China lacked the ability to 
compete with outside forces. “The arrival of Western merchants, 
industries, railways, gunboats and ideas upset and changed the 
usual course of events…The security and permanence of the 
Chinese system under whatever rule came to an end.”102 The 
foreign nations, who had become a greater presence in China by 
the 1900’s, would lead to its future problems. 
The instigators to these problems were the Boxers. The 
Boxers, ancestors to China’s Nationalist Party of 1911, were 
strictly anti foreign. Foreign competition had left the cotton 
production in Shandong in a state of poverty. The residents also 
faced flooding in the Yellow River, financial decline, drought, plus 
numerous invasions by foreign groups. Out of Shandong, the 
Boxers began their attacks against foreigners. What started as a 
fraction of a small group would help lead to the demise of Qing 
Rule and Cixi in particular. Cixi’s court issued commands to 
tolerate, not suppress, the Boxers and soon joined the anti-foreign 
movement. Any within the Qing court who opposed were 
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executed. The national court did little to stop the Boxer violence 
and forced the involvement of foreign nations. The Qing lost and 
heavy reparations were issued, which the treasury had no way to 
pay. In light of this, foreign nations, such as England and France, 
took control over much of the revenue producing areas of the 
government, such as the salt administration, until the debt was 
paid. The power and safety the Manchus had known no longer 
existed.103 Whatever power remained would only be preserved 
through reform. 
The motivations behind the reforms that came about after 
the Boxer Rebellion were different than those of the reform of 
1898. During the reign of Guangxi, there was a desire to reshape 
China to create a united nation through the blending of the two 
cultures. During the reign of Cixi, and that of Pu’yi, reform was for 
the sake of control. The January 29, 1901 Reform Edict stated that 
“the whole system of government must be radically transformed so 
that wealth and power might eventually be attained.”104 The 
Dowager Empress had ended the reforms of 1898 with a coup and 
executions. What had changed was that Cixi had invested in the 
wrong side during the Boxer Rebellion and lost. In an act of self-
preservation, Cixi gave into the reforms.  
Among the first reforms that the edict called for was the 
blending of both Chinese and foreign policies, to “suppress 
vigorously the use of the terms, ‘new’ and ‘old’, and to blend 
together the best of what is Chinese and what is foreign.”105 The 
policies of old that had been harmful to China included the ones 
concerning the Manchus. The banner system and the imperial 
court, which had closed the ranks to any non-Manchu groups, 
began to open its doors. Even with the end of the separation, the 
Manchus believed the barriers had existed for a reason. In the case 
of intermarriage, Cixi stated the rarity of intermarriage was due to 
unfamiliarity with each other’s culture, customs, and language.106 
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After several hundred years of social separation, one would think 
that the unfamiliarity between the two would have grown. Even if 
it did, the desire to maintain control over the empire took 
precedence over the desire for separation.  
The forced end of separation between the Han and the 
Manchu did not only focus on social aspects but moved on to the 
political theatre. December 29, 1903 marked the end of Manchu 
monopoly on posts in the banner system and the ban barring all 
non-Manchu entry into Manchuria. In the process of reforming 
China, Cixi reshaped the social and political demography by taking 
several steps to move the government from a monarchy to a 
constitutional monarchy, giving the people more power. Set to be 
implemented over a number of years, this was to be Cixi’s last 
attempt to maintain control over China. However for all the 
changes and reforms that were implemented, the circumstances in 
China did not improve. Outside voices praised the reforms that 
worked to end the “distinctions between Manchus and Chinese,” 
but also cautiously watched over the new Chinese parliament. 107 
With the Qing working to end the distinction between the 
Han and the Manchus, the late nineteenth to early twentieth 
century Manchus no longer resembled their ancestors who had 
conquered the Ming in the 1640’s. Some key ethnic traits, such as 
the banner system, began to show signs of decay as early as the 
Taiping Rebellion. Archery, once an often practiced skill, now 
began to be seen as a novelty as guns became the weapon of 
choice. Yet to say that the Manchus had acculturated into the 
Chinese culture would be dismissing the other traits that did 
survive, such as the Manchu language. The Yongzheng emperor 
was correct when he stated: “If some special encouragement as this 
is not offered, the ancestral language will not be passed on and 
learned.”108 In the beginning of the Manchu conquest, schools 
were created with the purpose of teaching and preserving the 
                                                
107 “China Takes Another Step,” Los Angeles Herald 34, no. 39, November 9, 
1906. 
108 Rhoads, 53. The Yongzheng Emperor (1678-1735) ruled during the High 
Qing. 
 
Manchus: A Horse of a Different Color 
 
 
108
Manchu language. However, by the Revolution of 1911, Chinese 
had become the main script, with little as one percent in cities 
being able to read Manchu, even less were able to speak it.109 
Chinese may have been the main language used in the cities, but 
the usage of Manchu increased as one ventured farther out, even in 
Manchuria. In the Imperial Court, documents were recorded in 
Chinese and Manchu.110 Banner schools also continued in its 
instruction of Manchu. The Manchu language, though limited in its 
use, remained a distinctive identity trait for the Manchus. 
Naming practices were also preserved by the Manchus. 
Over the course of Han and Manchu interaction, Manchu names 
began to reflect more Han monosyllabic style names. Manchu 
personal names (first names) became shortened to disyllabic and 
meaning was also taken into consideration.111 The first names had 
changed but the family names (last names) were not. When certain 
Manchus, who were in no way attached to the imperial clan, 
changed their polysyllabic surnames to the monosyllabic style of 
the Han, the Qing officials were displeased. The changing of the 
personal names held no importance to the Qing, however to change 
their surnames would come to mean they had “forgotten their 
roots.”112 The surname was the connection to their past. At the 
same time as the surname was being preserved, the Manchu 
identification was also maintained. In the beginning, Manchus 
identified themselves by their banner affiliation rather than their 
familial lineage, as the Han did. Still true, the Manchus preferred 
to use other choices in place of their surname, in this case their 
personal names. Though small, seemingly unimportant ethnic 
traits, these traits still presented an image of who the Manchus 
were, as well as maintaining their separation from the Chinese 
culture.  
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At this point it became evident that the Manchus had not 
sinicized into the Chinese Culture, as stated by Zhang Binglin: 
  
Today, have the Manchus assimilated to the Han 
people? Or have they conquered the Han people? 
Manchu shamanism is not the orthodox imperial 
religion, queues and jeweled necklaces are not the 
Chinese caps; and the documents of the Qing in its 
own language are not traditional Chinese 
orthodox… Their talk of the ‘same race’ is not to 
turn the Manchus into Han people, but to make the 
Han people Manchus!  
 
The Han may have grown accustomed to the lifestyle of the 
Manchu and had grown accustomed to the queue, but for the Han, 
it was not their natural lifestyle.113 Nor did they agree with the 
favorable treatment shown only to the Manchus. General Zeng and 
General Zou had been the heroes of the Taiping Rebellion. The 
Generals were also Han Chinese. They were given the titles but 
commanded local forts with no real power. On the other hand, a 
Manchu governor who suppressed an uprising in Taiwan, less 
significant, was made a “Beile Commandery Prince.”114 
Cixi and the imperial court had taken measures to unite the 
Manchus and Han under one culture. Upon her death, these 
reforms were then entrusted to the three-year-old emperor, Pu’yi, 
and his father Zaifeng, who served as Pu’yi’s regent.115 The first 
steps in Cixi’s plan to reform the Manchu/Han relations 
encompassed reforms such as reorganizing the banner system, 
eliminating the banner stipends, and dissolving the eight banner 
system to end all differences between the Manchus and Han.116 But 
the retaining of such traits as names and language, made it clear 
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that, despite their best efforts, the barriers would not come down. 
The ones holding onto these barriers were the Manchus. All 
Manchu men had been restricted on where they could seek 
occupations, either within the banner system or state 
bureaucracy.117 When jobs proved to be difficult to find, the 
stipends became the supplement to their livelihoods. The increased 
burden and pressure on the government to reform occurred when 
the Manchus began to live above their means. The reforms of the 
1900’s, threatened to take away their only source of income, their 
lifestyle, and thrust them into jobs they were not equipped to 
handle. As soon as it became clear this was to be their future, the 
bannermen pressured Zaifeng, who eventually succumbed to their 
demands.118 
Any attempt by Zaifeng to consolidate control through the 
means of reform, failed. The bannermen feared any change that 
would remove their social status, such as a change in the mourning 
period. Han tradition calls for the mourning period to last twenty-
seven months. Due to the length of time, Han officials were forced 
to resign from their posts, which were then given away. The 
Manchus were not faced with this problem. The Manchu mourning 
period lasted only a hundred days, a time that did not force them to 
resign from their posts. Upon the movement to end ethnic 
differences, the Ministry of Rites mandated that the Han mourning 
period would be observed by both sides in order to create equality. 
Instead Zaifeng, upon the request by the Manchus, left a loophole 
which made it possible for officials to remain in their positions 
during the mourning period, so long as they petitioned to do so.  
Han officials rarely petitioned to remain in their positions. The 
largest number of officials who used this loophole was the Manchu 
officials.119 Zaifeng also attempted to reinstate a small fracture of 
the power the Qing once held by making the emperor the direct 
commander over the military.120 While Zaifeng had hoped for the 
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revival of the Manchus as the dominating ethnic group, revolution 
forced him to eliminate all differences, including Manchu 
women’s dress, opening Manchu cities, etc. Yet all of this did little 
to diffuse the spread of revolution.121  
Many doubted the effectiveness of these reforms. “It is 
predicted that unless the Manchus immediately demonstrate the 
sincerity of the imperial edicts being issued at Peking the slaughter 
will exceed that of the Taiping rebellion.”122 Zaifeng had his five-
year-old son, Pu’yi, issue an edict taking the blame for appointing 
too many officials that were imperial relatives and also enacted the 
reforms of the Guangxi emperor.123 All were done to preserve the 
power and control of the Manchus and the Qing Court. However 
this edict and any that followed were seen as an act. “All today’s 
edicts, like that of yesterday, are written in the first person, as 
coming from the infant emperor himself. This is unusual and 
apparently a device adopted by the throne’s advisers in a pathetic 
attempt to create among the people a feeling of personal loyalty for 
their sovereign.”124  
This tool did not work. Further complicating the problems 
arising was the poor financial state China was in. Upon the 
conquest of the Ming, the financial state was also in decline, due to 
the decadence of the court. Just over two hundred years later and 
the banner people faced the same problem as they lived above their 
means, placing a burden on the government. Decadence was still a 
weakness of the court as descriptions of Cixi’s funeral portray 
scenes of splendor as her body is wrapped with pearls, gold, gems, 
things the treasury could not afford. 125  The overspending of the 
court, along with the pressures incurred upon the Han became too 
great and the revolutionists issued a proclamation to the people that 
stated: “In order to establish a reign of liberty, equality and 
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fraternity the Manchus must be driven out at once; the people must 
unite together to form a new government.” 126 The Qing Dynasty 
was at an end. 
The Revolutionaries had many reasons to justify their 
attack on the millennium old monarchial system and the Manchus. 
Among those justifications was a seven point argument taken from 
the 1898 Affair, first being the Manchus was an alien group. Social 
Darwinism had developed the idea that the five races had 
subgroups that continuously had divided down. The “yellow race” 
included the Chinese and Siberian as its subgroups. From the 
Chinese came the Han, Korean, and Japanese. The Manchus were 
thought to have come from the Siberian subgroup.127 According to 
this ideology, the Manchus held no link to the Chinese, therefore 
they held no right to the throne. “China belongs to the Chinese” as 
one reformer, Zhang Ji, stated.128 If their lack of Chinese ties did 
not prove their illegitimacy as rulers, their crimes against the Han 
Chinese in 1644 did. The words of Wang Xiuchu, survivor of the 
Yangzhou massacre, became a lesson for the revolutionaries: “All I 
intend is that people of later generations who are fortunate to live 
in a peaceful world and to enjoy uneventful times, but who neglect 
self-cultivation and reflection and are inveterately profligate, will 
read this and be chastened.” 129 The acts of cruelty and murders of 
the 1644 conquest had made the Manchus a long lasting enemy of 
the Han. 
The points against the Manchus varied in gravity from 
mass murders to the implementation of their own culture upon the 
Han Chinese. By forcing their culture upon the Han Chinese, the 
Manchus had “barbarized China.”130 The culture of the Ming, a 
culture of scholars, was no more. The Manchus had adopted 
Confucianism and the civil examination system into their own 
culture, but rejected the core beliefs, and by having the Han shave 
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their forelocks in submission, they disregarded filial piety. Not 
only that but a culture based on the importance of meritocracy 
witnessed a minority group place itself over the majority.131 
Privileges, key government positions, and promotions were given 
to Manchus, whereas the Han were pushed out. Divisions 
throughout the empire had become the standard way of life. 
“Although it has been over two hundred years, the Manchus stick 
with the Manchus and the Han stick with the Han; they have not 
mingled. Clearly there is a feeling that a lower race does not rank 
with a noble one.”132 Neither was on the level of the other, so 
relations between the two never occurred.  
By stating the reasons as to why the Manchus were the 
illegitimate rulers of China, it created an opportunity for the Han to 
examine their identity as a nation. Many scholars of this period, 
including Zhou Rong, made the claim that to have the legitimacy 
to rule over China, one had to be a descendant of the Yellow 
Emperor, the very first ruler of the first dynastic cycle.133 Han were 
said to be these descendants, establishing theirs as the only legal 
ethnicity of China.134  
The seven points to discredit the Manchus, plus the idea of 
a need to separate themselves from the Manchus all marked the 
true unifying tool for the Han, Anti-Manchuism.135  
 
How could we have allowed the unworthy tribes of 
Mongolia and Manchuria, who knew nothing of 
China or Confucianism, to steal China by means of 
their barbarism and brutality! After stealing China, 
they controlled the Chinese by means of the system 
they had stolen, and they shamelessly made use of 
Confucianism, with which they had been 
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unfamiliar, to oppress China, to which they had 
been strangers.136  
 
A fault of the Manchus, according to Tan Sitong, a former pupil of 
Kang, was that they knew nothing about the political system or 
Confucianism before their conquest of China. This did not stop the 
Manchus from using these cultures to keep people ignorant and 
under the Manchu’s control. In the end, the Han’s own culture had 
played a part in their conquest and their subjugation. “Today five 
million Manchus rule over more than four hundred million Han 
only because rotten traditions make the Han stupid and ignorant. If 
the Han people should one day wake up, then the Manchus would 
be totally unable to rest peacefully.”137 On October 10, 1911, the 
Han did wake up and so did their resentments for the Manchus.  
On the surface, the revolution was a chance for China to 
join the modern political systems of the world. Below the surface, 
the revolution gave the Han a chance to act upon their anti-Manchu 
sentiments. In Wuchang, where the Revolution began, the Taiping 
Rebellion had left a large concentration of Manchus. At the 
outbreak of the Revolution, as they headed for the arsenal, one 
revolutionary cried: “Slay the Manchu officials and the banner 
people.” Despite the lack of resistance, many Manchus were 
slaughtered. The Hubei Military government’s goals were to 
“elevate the Han and exterminate the Manchus.”138 Students were 
convinced to join the cause of revolution through the argument of 
filial piety. The nationalists claimed it was their duty to avenge 
their ancestors who had suffered at the hands of the Qing.139 The 
elimination of the Manchus began with the taking down of the 
imperial flag over the imperial customs office and ended with the 
extermination of the Manchus. “Brutal treatment of Chinese by 
Manchus has created bad impression, and slaughter that will 
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exceed that of the Taiping revolution is predicted.”140 Manchu 
cities became drenched with the color of red. Those who managed 
to escape the bloodshed in the Manchu cities were no safer as they 
were killed upon entering Chinese cities. Tales of mass terror came 
forward as Chinese military leaders told the soldiers to spare any 
except the Manchus. “One banner woman, about to be killed, 
piteously cried, ‘We are guiltless; we detest our ancestors for their 
mistreatment of the Han people.’ Another old woman pleaded, 
‘What is to be gained by murdering us worthless women and 
children? Why not release us as a show of your magnanimity?’ 
The soldiers, though moved, dared not reply but killed them 
anyway.” 141 No help came for the Manchus as foreign nations’ 
concern turned to pulling out their missionaries instead of listening 
to the cries of Yuan Shikai.142  
Violence reigned throughout the Qing Empire. Manchus 
also participated in the killings as Han Chinese were no safer than 
the Manchus. The violence during this period not only showed the 
resentment between the two, but also how the barriers, though 
officially removed, still existed. The Manchus  
 
were known by their clothing, by their cast of 
countenance, by their speech. Their fondness for 
reds and yellows, their use of white linings, their 
high collars and narrow sleeves . . . their belts, their 
shoes; all gave them away. With the women the 
unbound feet were the fatal distinction. Their 
peculiar headdress, their clothing they might 
change, but there was no disguising their natural-
sized feet.143 
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The Manchus had changed since 1644, but not enough that they 
were unable to be signaled out by “their speech.”144 The Manchus’ 
separate identity had been part of their downfall. 
As the Qing Dynasty and the Manchus fell, the Republic of 
China rose to power along with a new sense of Chinese identity. 
China underwent a severe transformation, as any remnants of the 
Manchu rule were removed. As Sha Tauk Kok related: “the 
Revolution has succeeded and my elder brother has cut his 
queue… The Manchus have starved to death, their intestines 
shriveled to nothing… Do not fear the Manchus will use their 
sharp knives.”145 As the Han cut their queues, they were cutting 
away all signs of Manchu submission. The queues had reverted 
back to being an identity marker for the Manchu males. The 
Chinese looked to rid China of all remnants of the Manchus’ past 
involvement. Part of this involved the political structure. 
The political change that China underwent was larger than 
the transition between a millennium old monarchial system to a 
republic. Upon the defeat of the Qing, the demands given to the 
Qing side included that the capital no longer be in Peking, which 
Yuan Shikai could not serve at the provincial level until the 
republic was recognized outside of China, and more importantly, 
that Manchus would not be allowed to serve at the provincial 
level.146 For as long as the Manchus restricted the participation of 
the Han in the government, after the revolution they faced the same 
treatment. The Han Chinese sought to eliminate any credence the 
Qing had gained during their time in power. “Old myths assumed 
new significance in the political context of the late Qing. They now 
spoke not merely to flexible ways of distinguishing ‘us’ from 
‘them’ through ethnicity and culture but also to the early growth of 
a specific ‘Chinese’ nation that –by implication-grew like the tree 
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from the seed into today’s Chinese nation.”147 Meaning that the 
Han stated that the beginning of the Chinese nation began with 
them, not the Manchus. As part of the process of establishing their 
own identity as the “Han People,” the revolutionaries dated the 
calendar to begin with the Yellow Emperor. The revolutionaries, in 
the process of creating their identity, took away the right of the 
Qing to set the calendar. To them, the entire period of the Qing 
Dynasty was an illegitimate period.  
The U.S. as well as other nations credited the new Chinese 
government, seeing the Chinese as “a patient people, peace-loving, 
law-abiding and with a fine respect for law. They are easily ruled if 
fairly ruled, but stroke them the wrong way and it is just the 
opposite.”148 Both a complement to the Han and an insult to the 
Manchus, this article that appeared in The Sun in February 1912, 
supported the new Chinese government due to the closed 
door/anti-foreign policy the Manchus had adopted during the last 
years of the dynasty. The article credits the Boxer Rebellion for 
opening China to Western ideas. The Manchu rule was over, the 
Han people had taken over, and China belonged the Chinese.  
The only issue remaining was Manchuria. The Sun article 
states that if China had succeeded in strengthening its forces and 
had acquired a stable government, Japan and Russia would have no 
choice but to relinquish their claim to Manchuria and Mongolia. 
Then again, if China failed to put forth an image of strength, or 
was “sick at that time,” outside forces would take over.149 
Manchuria would become available to any strong nation, except to 
those who can claim ancestral ties to it, the Manchus. Enter Japan, 
China, and a desperate ethnic group.  
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Manchuria Turned Manchukuo: The 1930’s  
 
Nearly twenty years after the fall of the Qing, the issue of 
sovereignty over Manchuria was still a problem. The Manchu 
emperor, Pu’yi, remained a resident in the Forbidden City in 
Peking, kept his title as emperor, and received an annual income of 
four million dollars.150 Because he still claimed the title of 
emperor, false hope was given to Pu’yi and all other Manchus that 
the resurrection of another Manchu dominated dynasty was 
possible. As the years passed, this false hope began to dwindle. 
After a failed attempt at a restoration in 1917, the emperor and his 
court were confined to their living quarters at the imperial palace 
in the Forbidden City. Whether or not by choice, Pu’yi had not left 
his area of the palace, not far from the throne. In a New York 
article written ten years after the revolution, author Nathaniel 
Peffer describes the scene “Of the once hallowed Forbidden City a 
large part is now trod by profane feet.”151 Once walked by tribute 
bearers who wore the finest jewels, the Forbidden City now acted 
as a public park where tea, cakes, even American sandwiches and 
beers are enjoyed.152 The Qing splendor had left Peking, as had 
their claim to Manchuria. 
With this in mind, awareness shifted to a question of who 
would take over first. Japan had long been a residential power in 
Manchuria, since Russia had signed over all rights of the South 
Manchurian Railway to Japan at the conclusion of the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905. In the same treaty, the Treaty of 
Portsmouth, Japan gained complete control of Korea.153 Logically, 
Manchuria was next on territory acquisition list. Japan supported 
the warlord of the region Zhang Zuolin in the hopes of having a 
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hand in the running of the country. When Zhang’s goals ventured 
away from the ideals of Japan, he was assassinated.154 Zhang 
Xueliang’s, Zhang’s son, support of Nationalism led to the 
intervention of the Japanese. This began the 1931 conflict with 
China for Manchuria.  
It is believed that the conflict was ignited by an attack on 
the railway. The attack was staged to give Japan reason to counter 
attack on the Chinese, claiming self-defense.155 China had long 
held anti-Japanese sentiment, taking every opportunity to exhibit 
their feelings, one being their refusal to lease Manchuria to 
Japan.156 To China, Manchuria was a piece of their territory 
(disregarding that its acquisition had more to do with their Manchu 
rulers). Japan’s move towards Manchuria reignited ill feelings, 
with commands such as “Kill Japanese on sight” being the first and 
only command given.157 Japan, on the other hand, claimed that 
they “do not want conquest there anymore than in China... Japan’s 
position there, as is well known, is strategical and political as well 
as economic.”158 Japan was a small island, whose own land was 
running out with the expansion of its population. Manchuria had 
miles of land unsettled, with bountiful resources. It seemed that for 
all purposes, Manchuria was to become a resource base for Japan, 
not part of its territory. Japan’s goal was to “foster friendly 
relations between Japan and China.”159 If China didn’t believe 
them, they had no problem stating “It may be superfluous to repeat 
that the Japanese government harbours no territorial designs in 
Manchuria.”160  Rather, Japan looked to create a new government 
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and the campaign against the Chinese would act as a way to “clear 
North Manchuria of what remained of the old military power, this 
removing an obstacle that had stood on the way of bringing the 
new state into being, materially clearing the atmosphere for the 
outlook of the future.”161 Japan won the war with China and 
Manchukuo was named an independent state in 1932.  
Once the battle was done, Japan had no reason to remain in 
Manchukuo. However “evidence” presented itself to the Japanese 
government that said otherwise. Seeing as the “Manchurian 
government at present is not strong enough to suppress them,” it 
was only natural that the Kwantung army took over to guarantee 
the safety and success of Manchukuo.162  The Manchus in power 
slowly faded into the background as Japan worked in Manchukuo 
to remold it. As its presence in Manchukuo, Japan’s actual purpose 
for freeing Manchukuo from China was revealed. Instead of its 
growth as an independent nation, Manchukuo was part of the 
evolution of the Japanese imperialism, one to rival the Western 
powers. Their goals represented their commitment to that dream. 
Japan, once a colonial prize for other nations, proved its own 
abilities at becoming a rival to Western powers. With its victories 
against China in 1894-5 and then again against a western power, 
with Russia in 1904-5, Japan proved its strengths.163 The first step 
was Korea. By acquiring Korea, Japan had acquired a “guest seat” 
at the imperial table, taking itself off the market as an area to 
conquer by the Western Powers.164 If Korea was to serve as a way 
to secure Japan, Manchuria was to secure Korea. In 1905, 
Manchuria became the buffer zone between the Japanese and the 
Chinese and any other western powers as Russia signed over any 
rights, interests, or influence it had acquired during the nineteenth 
century. Japan had already integrated itself into the elite of 
Manchuria; it wasn’t long before they took complete control.165 
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The real power holders in Manchukuo were the capitalists 
and the military. Manchukuo served Japan in its attempt at 
imperialism, at the same time renovating “[Kaizo] Japan.”166 “The 
Manchurian paradise depicted by Manchukuo government planners 
was intended to become the model of state capitalism, with 
industrialization proceeding in steps according to a well-ordered 
plan.”167 Manchuria was said to be enough to satisfy everyone. 
However its main purpose was to satisfy one group, the Japanese 
army, the Kwantung Army, who saw Manchuria as a resource 
base.168 The emperor of Japan had no more say in the matter of 
Manchukuo than Pu’yi or the other non-Japanese residents. Japan 
transformed Manchukuo, the banner soldiers were replaced by the 
Kwantung Army as the main fighting force, and the governments 
allowed for risky investments by the banks. All of these factors 
were signs that the military had taken control of the government.169  
Japan remained in control of Manchukuo until the end of 
World War II. It’s only goal for Manchuria was to fortify its place 
among the imperial powers of the world. Aligning with Pu’yi had 
been for the purpose of using his alliance with the Mongols and to 
serve as a buffer zone as the Manchus were on the border and 
Japan was under constant threat from Russia and China.170 “Japan 
has brought this situation to pass as a means of securing essential 
raw materials and food products for her own people and a market 
for her manufactured goods.”171 
 Some would state that the 1895 Sino-Japanese War had 
been warning enough for the Manchus at the motives of the 
Japanese. However it made no difference to the Manchus and 
Pu’yi. During the Qing Dynasty, the Manchus had been the ones in 
power, the leading ethnicity. To be allied with the Manchus meant 
to hold a title of prominence. The Manchu banners were awarded 
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stipends to cover all of their costs, extra for courage in battle, but 
they did not face the same grueling civil service examination that 
the Han did and official posts were easier to come by. By 1911 the 
Chinese declared  that the Manchus would no longer be eligible to 
hold positions at the provincial level.172 Pu’yi may have bared the 
title of emperor, but it was a title with little power, as his salary 
was now dictated by the Republic and decreasing from the initial 
millions to 500,000.173 Pu’yi was faced with the reality of his 
actual power in China during his flight from Peking, where he was 
addressed as “Mr. Pu’yi.”174 Nor was it more obvious that the 
revival of the Qing in China was unlikely to happen as once it was 
made by a declaration in the Washington Times that “it was 
decreed that the Manchus should never again hold power.”175 
Power was not the only motivating factor for Pu’yi’s 
decision to side with the Japanese. As commented upon 
continuously, resentment between the Han and Manchus persisted 
throughout the Qing Dynasty. It also persisted long after. On 
November 5 1924, Warlord General Feng Yu-hsiang invaded 
Peking. The General’s attitude was one that fell along the same 
sentiments of 1911, sentiments that had led to the extermination of 
Manchus. The Manchus in Peking feared that the General’s anti-
Manchu beliefs would lead to a massacre and Pu’yi and his court 
finally vacated the old capital of the Qing Dynasty. However, no 
act showed the resentment shared between the two more than the 
final act that pushed Pu’yi to seek aid from China’s enemy, Japan. 
In 1928, one Chinese group, in an act of Cultural Revolution, 
desecrated the tombs of the Qianlong Emperor and the Empress 
Dowager Cixi. Jewels were stolen, statues smashed, and the bones 
of the dead were scattered. While the republic celebrated the action 
as “heavenly justice,” it angered Pu’yi. “My heart smouldered with 
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a hatred I had never known before… Standing before the dark and 
gloomy funerary hall I made an oath before my weeping clansmen: 
‘If I do not avenge this wrong I am not an Aisin-Gioro.’ i.e. a 
faithful member of the imperial Manchu clan.”176 Pu’yi sought 
every opportunity for the revival of the Manchus and revenge 
against the Chinese. His advisors warned him against the division 
between the military and the citizens of Japan, foreseeing the 
power the military would hold. However Pu’yi leapt at the chance, 
with no regards to the repercussions.177  
There were many reasons for Pu’yi’s decision. Among the 
reasons, personal revenge remained among the strongest motives. 
Pu’yi looked for revenge against the Republic for the crimes 
against the Manchus and the revival of the Qing. Second, 
Manchuria had been the homeland to the Manchus. Closed off to 
foreign occupants until the early twentieth century, to the 
Manchus, Manchuria was a sacred site. However, by this point, it 
was not only the Manchus who had made Manchuria their home. 
The Japanese made it clear of their goal to help the “Manchurian 
people win their freedom from Chinese rule.’ There was an 
element of disingenuity in the exchange which both accepted 
Manchuria consisted largely of Chinese; why would Chinese free 
themselves from Chinese?”178 Pu’yi’s personal goals were not 
those of the remaining Manchurian residents. Open to the public, 
Manchuria’s demographic had drastically changed. Manchu once 
again was the minority. The only difference this time is the 
majority agreed with the minority. Manchuria had disagreed with 
the Republic from the beginning, choosing to remain loyal to the 
emperor.  
Loyalty alone did not motivate the residents of Manchuria 
to fight against China. The current residents, including Manchus, 
Mongols, and Japanese, had been left in the hands of warlord 
Zhang Zuolin. With the goal to establish himself as the ruler of 
China, Zhang started a military effort to achieve this goal, an effort 
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that required funds. “Civilian elites in the region were unhappy at 
the way in which Zhang raised taxes and overrode their newly 
constituted assemblies, and even some of his military subordinates, 
notably Guo Songling in 1925, attempted to overthrow him.”179 
Even after his assassination in 1928 and the takeover of his son 
Zhang Xueliang, Manchuria’s current situation failed to improve. 
His alienation of the locals and the military, through the means of 
abolishing both the provincial governments and military, led the 
way to the acceptance of the Japanese in 1931.180 In turn, it forced 
Zhang to turn to Nanjing for support against the Japanese backed 
opposition.181 This proved to be a poor decision for Zhang, as the 
Nationalists Chinese government held no favor in the eyes of the 
Manchus. During the 1911 Revolution, the Manchus were seen as 
a foreign force and targeted. Zhang Xueliang and his associates’ 
decision to not only support the nationalist movement, but to allow 
its legalization within Manchuria and for some to become 
members had meant that they were inviting the Manchus’ enemy 
into their house.182 Resentment for the Manchus and their crimes 
during the 1644 conquest had been held onto for nearly three 
hundred years; there is no doubt that the Manchus could do the 
same. 
Aside from questionable alliances, the financial state of 
Manchuria was in decline. Though promising the installation of 
industry and commerce and emphasis on education, Zhang 
Xueliang’s spending resembled that of his father, who had created 
the financial burden in the first place. Had it not been for the 
money spent on the military, as noted by the Japanese upon their 
intervention, “the finance of the Three Eastern Provinces would 
show a good surplus.”183 Japan appeared to be no different from 
China, whose goal of “reclaiming” Manchuria was proclaimed 
with every maneuver. However, Japan proceeded with caution. Its 
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already conquered territories in Korea and Taiwan were colonized 
but this was not the route that could be taken with Manchuria. 
Instead, the independent state of Manchukuo was formed.184 The 
formation of the South Manchurian Railway and immigration had 
been Japan’s beginning as a presence in Manchuria.  
There was no greater show of Japanese control in 
Manchuria than in their involvement in the economy in Manchuria. 
With plans of a centralized dictatorship, the Kwantung Army was 
in charge of all future Manchurian expansion in the interests of 
Japan. Part of their plans involved creating a planned economy, 
with the army playing the role of the creators. An attempt to reign 
in the growing debt, the Kwantung Army stated, “In view of the 
evils of an uncontrolled capitalist economy, we will use whatever 
state power is necessary to control that economy.”185 For some, 
this was a saving act against a high debt. Yet many opposed to a 
government economy. It meant losing control of all decisions, of 
all businesses, such as the Railways. For many, Manchuria 
presented an opportunity of freer politics than in the surrounding 
nations. However many of the policies made came from a Japanese 
perspective as that was the dominating group in power.186  
Acceptance of the local government had given the Japanese 
an advantage in their taking of Manchuria. Their increased 
involvement in the economy, plus their planned attempt to expunge 
the Manchurian economy of its debt, also aided in the conquest of 
Manchuria by the Japanese. While the national level was 
reconstructed to rid the policies of Zhang, it appeared that 
Manchuria, now Manchukuo, was formed without bloodshed. Yet 
the supposedly peaceful take over covered resistance from 
volunteer armies, supported by China, and mostly composed of 
bandits. With the purpose to oppose the intrusion of the Japanese 
on what was once consider to be part of China, dissension came 
not between the Kwantung Army and the “volunteers” but between 
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these volunteers and the ordinary people.187 The volunteer army 
was not alone in their willingness to attack to maintain their claim 
to Manchuria. The Kwantung Army not only quickly put down 
these attacks but put on hold their peaceful conquest to exhibit 
their willingness to acquire Manchuria by force.   The city of 
Fushun saw much bloodshed as houses were burned and lives were 
lost, all at the hands of the Kwantung Army. Blame for the 
massacre was laid at the feet of the villagers when rebels had left 
many Japanese dead. In reality, Fushun was one of many examples 
of the Japanese’s strength and willingness to use brutal force as a 
tool in the acquisition of Manchuria.188 
For all Pu’yi’s attempts to restore the Manchus, it appeared 
that the identity of the Manchus was slowly changing. It was not 
changing to model a traditional Chinese culture, but a western one. 
Pu’yi’s tutor after the 1911 fall was the English bred Reginald 
Fleming Johnston, whose influence began to reshape Pu’yi. 
Johnston’s influence came to touch every aspect of Pu’yi’s life, 
from using a fork instead of chopsticks, to prizing wool instead of 
the silks and satins of China. However, no greater influence, or 
greater change for that matter, was as great as Johnston’s role in 
the cutting of the queue. Despite the pleas of the republic over the 
course of the years, one remark from Johnston referring to the 
queues as “pigtails,” pushed Pu’yi shed the queue in 1919. Many 
would follow within the Forbidden City.189 Pu’yi adopted an 
English name, Henry, and so the transformation appeared to be in 
the favor of modernization.  
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 Sir Reginald Fleming Johnston. China Institute in America.190 
 
The outside world was changing. The 1900’s had brought 
change in technology, fashion, thought, as well as political 
structures. These changes were not central to nations such as the 
United States or Europe. Rather, the ideas of modernization spread 
as trade between the many nations expanded. As the modern world 
put forth the image of the ideal style, the queue quickly lost its 
place of importance, as did other traditional garb. Though 
modernization had transformed the exterior side of the Manchu 
identity, it did not transform its ideals. At the time when marriage 
came into question, many encouraged the marriage of Pu’yi to a 
Chinese girl, seeing it as a political strategy. However the desire to 
“maintain the ‘purity’ of the royal bloodline too overpowering” in 
order to compromise their beliefs for an upper hand.191 Even with 
the policy of intermarriage put forth by Cixi, it was still a taboo for 
a Manchu to marry a Chinese, especially if he should be wearing 
the crown.  
If there was to be one lasting physical trait that continued 
for the Manchu identity, it would be the dress. After finally being 
made emperor of Manchukuo, Pu’yi sent for the Qing imperial 
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robes for his ascension to the throne. By doing so, Pu’yi marked 
how heritage still held a place of honor among the Manchus.192 
Pu’yi still claimed his lineage to the Aisin-Gioro clan of old, 
whose opinion was of concern to Pu’yi when the Japanese rejected 
his plan to wear the imperial robes. Pu’yi still held ties to Aisin-
Gioro just as he held ties to shaman practices. For as much as 
modernity rejects these practices, on the day of his enthronement, 
Pu’yi said a prayer while a “snow-white bull” was sacrificed and 
the rising smoke of the altar symbolized “the transmission of his 
prayers to the spirits of the dead.”193 Had the Manchus assimilated, 
Confucianism would have been the major belief system, a belief 
system that itself was faltering at the end of the Qing Dynasty and 
blamed for the loss of the Opium War.194 Much of what was the 
Chinese culture at the end of the Ming had fallen to modernity, as 
outside and inside influences had changed as the definition 
Chinese Culture during that time.195 
 
 
 Image of Pu’yi/Emperor, 1909-1911. China Institute in America.196 
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It was not only religious standards maintained but also 
ideas about social stratification. The banner system, a core of 
Manchu identity, had long lost its warrior side and thus was 
replaced by Japan’s Kwantung Army as the main fighting force.197 
However the banner system still remained. Upon his entry into 
Hsinking on route to the throne Pu’yi was greeted by five 
Manchukuo banners.198 If only ceremonial, the presence of the 
banners, as well as claiming the Aisin-Gioro title, shows Pu’yi’s 
and the Manchu’s connection to the past. While others followed 
Pu’yi to modernization, others remained deeply loyal to the 
Manchu ethnic identity and kept their queues when Pu’yi cut 
his.199 In the end, the agreement between Japan and Manchukuo 
spoke to certain guidelines to their relationship.  For example, each 
would respect the others territory and rights. None had the 
allowance to cross the other’s borders or specifically, change those 
borders. Also, Manchukuo was required to respect the rights, 
interests, and treaties already established within Manchukuo at the 
same time provide aid for each other if the need arises. The last 
requirement made the presence of Japanese troops in Manchukuo 
required.200 Japan’s take over not only overshadowed Manchu rule 
but also their identity.  
Outside forces offered different opinions on Manchukuo 
and who the Manchus might be. In a news article that came out in 
1934, one philosophy/economics professor from the United States, 
Charles F. Stickle, spoke on the circumstances in Manchukuo. 
While the article fails to address the actual lecture, it does mention 
how the United States sees the Manchus. Not only does the 
professor dress in “full regalia” but he is assisted by a woman, also 
dressed in Manchu fashion, who plays the role as “his number one 
wife.” “His wife” and he then “made obeisance to the incense altar 
in the approved Manchu fashion, where a statue of Buddha and 
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ancestral tablets were placed.”201 The article focused on the 
different dress styles and the fact that having more than one wife 
was the standard in Manchukuo instead of the circumstances in 
Manchukuo, as the professor was playing the role as a second class 
Manchu. However, the article shows that the Manchu’s ethnic 
distinction still existed, even if it was not as prevalent as it had 
once been. As one may recall, though the Manchus adopted the 
religions of China, such as Buddhism and Confucianism, 
shamanism was the core religion of the Manchus. Disregarding the 
mention of the Buddha statue, the article mentions the act of 
respect shown for the altar and to the ancestral tablets. Part of the 
Shaman culture involved performing ceremonies or sacrifices to 
spirits or ancestors to signal respect. This part of the Manchu 
identity had not disappeared over the course of the years. Not only 
did the United States observe this custom, but Pu’yi also exhibited 
this cultural aspect as he made his way to the tomb of Nurhaci and 
made an offering and said a prayer to his deceased ancestor.202 
While conversion to the western religions was encouraged, the 
Manchus held on to their own.  
The U.S. did recognize the culture but, along with the 
Chinese government, failed to recognize Manchukuo as 
independent state. Part of the purpose of the Lytton Commission of 
1933  was to address the current problems within Manchuria, and 
its solutions to those problems. The administration of Manchuria 
was created by the Chinese to protect it from neighboring nations 
who would take advantage of the weak state, such as the Japanese. 
The administration developed into a complex system, whose 
purpose was to strengthen the internal government to defend itself. 
. However, the understanding between China and Manchuria was 
that “even during these political changes, the laws promulgated by 
the Central government with reference to civil, financial and 
judicial matters, were completely enforced as before.”203 The 
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political changes, the Lytton Commission describes, is the move 
from the Monarchial system of the past to the Republic, who 
retained the power to make appointments over Manchuria, such as 
the creation of a provincial government and its appointments in 
1928.204 These powers, as well as its claim to Manchuria, came 
from the argument that it not only was part of China but also based 
on population. The Lytton Commission believed that the “term 
immigrants” had been incorrectly used to describe those who had 
made their way into Manchuria. Blaming this mistake on the 
Japanese government, the Chinese government stated that since 
most of the new residents had come from other parts of China, the 
term that should be used is migrants.205 Seeing many of the 
residents of Manchuria had come from China, the only logical 
thought is China had governance rights to Manchuria.  
Thomas Jefferson once stated, “We surely cannot deny to 
any nation that right where on our own government is founded- 
that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it 
pleases… The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be 
regarded.”206 It seems natural that the U.S. would then side with 
the newly formed Manchukuo, seeing it as the will of the 
government and its leader lies with its formation. However this 
was not the case. On January 7, 1932, at the conclusion of the Sino-
Japanese war, U.S. representative Henry Stimson created the 
Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition. The doctrine simply states 
that “the United States ‘does not intend to recognize any situation, 
treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means 
contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of 
August 27, 1928.”207 This included the creation of Manchukuo. 
Few within the US, such as George Bronson Rea, saw this as going 
against the core belief of the United States and how it came into 
existence; if the people had of Manchukuo have recognized it as a 
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state, follow its laws, then it is a state, “recognition does not create 
the state,”208he reasoned. 
Rea echoed the claims of the Manchus that Manchukuo, or 
Pu’yi, were  not Chinese. To the Chinese, Pu’yi was a traitor and 
thus, they refused to recognize Manchukuo’s independence.209 As 
stated by Rea, “no proof can be adduced to support the contention 
that the Manchus have died out…”210 Even if the only recognized 
Manchu was Pu’yi and his court, it is evidence against the idea that 
all Manchus had ceased to exist. Due to the fact that Manchus still 
exist, by example of Pu’yi and the anti-Manchuism of the time, 
China had no right to Manchuria based on this claim. Furthermore, 
by the time of the Japanese takeover, approximately three percent 
of the population was made up of Manchus.211 Though their 
numbers had decreased immensely since they first came into 
power in 1644, action of tracking their population shows that the 
Manchus were still a recognizable part of the population in China. 
The parts of their ethnic identity they had kept were enough to 
make a clear distinction between the Manchus and the Han. The 
Han Chinese have always outnumbered the Manchus, a fact that 
argued against Manchu rule. The Han could see no reason as to 
why the minority ruled over the majority. Nor does it have a claim 
to Manchuria based on immigration numbers. If this were so, the 
U.S. would have lost Hawaii to Japan.212 
The Manchus have long held the right of possession to 
Manchuria as their homeland. The right to govern Manchuria 
belongs to the Manchus.213 Manchuria has long been a place by 
which to draw replacement troops from during conquest and a safe 
haven. To preserve the purity of the Manchus in their homeland, 
the Qing rulers barred all Chinese from entering and residing in 
Manchuria, a ban that lasted until the end of the Qing rule. 
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Furthermore, said purity was also ensured by the banning of 
marriage between the bannermen and the Han. Any claim the 
Chinese held in the past was removed with the Manchu occupation 
during the Qing Dynasty.214 Rea’s claim against Chinese 
sovereignty shows that even the Western forces were divided over 
the question of whether Manchukuo was its own state and whether 
or not the Manchus were its own people. At the same time, his 
claims also showed that the Manchu were a recognized ethnic 
group. The outsides, such as the United States or Europe, only 
justification for its support of Han rule was they could not tell the 
difference between the two.215 Then again, can one tell the 
difference between an American and a Canadian? Physically no, as 
was the case for the Manchus, once the queue was removed in 
1919. Yet as seen, the traits that identified them as an ethnic group 
were there and the fact that they still claimed to be Manchus also 
showed that they did not belong to any other group.  
Conclusion 
 
By the end of World War II, Japan had lost it claim to Manchukuo 
and the Manchus lost whatever false sense of power they held. 
Manchukuo was absorbed back into China’s dominion and the 
Manchus were officially recognized as a legal ethnic group in 
1949. Despite their recognition, many believe that “when the 
barbarian enters China (i.e. Chinese civilization) he becomes 
Chinese.”216 Over the centuries the Manchu identity had changed. 
Events such as the Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, the 1898 
Affair, the 1911 Revolution, and the rise of Manchukuo in 1932 
have forced the Manchu identity to evolve. Yet while the Manchu 
identity has changed, it has not disappeared.  
In 1919, Pu’yi was the first Manchu to cut his queue, a long 
standing symbol of Manchu identity and conquest. Many may look 
at this as the Manchus’ move to assimilate. However the Manchus 
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did not claim to be Chinese. Modernity had forced these changes, 
not Chinese culture. The biggest influence on the Manchu identity 
was an individual not of Chinese or Japanese nationality but an 
Englishman by the name of Sir Reginald Fleming Johnston. For 
sinicization to occur, one of Chinese culture must be present. The 
biggest sign that the Manchu identity still remained separate were 
the actions and beliefs of the Manchus and the Han.  
The Manchus saw themselves to be different from the Han. 
Part of the problem that arose was the generalization of the two 
races, in part due to the opinions of outside forces, such as the U.S. 
as seen from the newspaper clippings and special reports seen 
throughout this paper. Over time the opinion may begin to become 
fact but it disregards actual events and circumstances. The 
Manchus were persistent on maintaining the border between 
themselves and the Han. Part of this barrier was constructed of 
biased testing, enforced hairstyle, and preferred treatment in 
political and social aspects. The Manchus were not alone in their 
desire to maintain ethnic borders. Just as the Manchus showed 
their contempt for the Han by the violence of the Yangzhou 
massacre, the Han showed that the border had lasted throughout 
the Qing Dynasty by the violence of the 1911 Revolution. Even as 
the twentieth century brought modernization, political change, as 
the Manchus faced the loss of their native land, their grasp of their 
identity did not falter. The only change in the identity of the 
Manchus went from being based on physical elements and more to 
an ideal and an ancestral connection. Until a law made it official, 
the only sign of the recognition of separate identities was usually 
through violence. Even with the confusion or the idea of their 
sinicization, the Manchus, by their own recognition, maintained 
their distinct ethnic identity, an identity that has lasted to this day.  
  
 
Hannah Knight 
 
 
135 
Bibliography 
 
“Bandits are Beheaded in Turn.” San Francisco 110, no. 178 
(November 25, 1911). Accessed November 10, 2014. 
California Digital Newspaper Collection. 
http://cdnc.ucr.edu. 
 
Brackman, Arnold. The Last Emperor. New York: Carroll & Graf 
Cheng, J. Chester. Orig. 1963, 1991.  
 
Cheng, James Chester. Chinese Sources for the Taiping Rebellion, 
1850-1864. Hong Kong and New York: Hong Kong 
University Press, Oxford University Press, 1963. 
 
_____”China Takes Another Step.” Los Angeles Herald 34, no. 39. 
(November 9, 1906).  
 
______”Chinese Government Yesterday and Today, “ The Sun, 
Fourth Section. (February 18, 1912).  
 
Crossley, Pamela Kyle, Helen F Siu, and Donald S Sutton. Empire 
at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early 
Modern China. Berkeley: University of California Press 
Berkeley, 2006. 
 
De Bary, William Theodore. Sources of Chinese Tradition: 
Volume 2: From 1600 Through the Twentieth Century. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
 
“Russo-Japanese War.”  Encyclopaedia Britannica. Last edited 
November 28, 2014. 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/514017/Russ-
Japanese-War. 
 
 
Manchus: A Horse of a Different Color 
 
 
136
Elliott, Mark C. The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic 
Identity in Late Imperial China. Stanford. Stanford 
University Press, 2001.  
 
Elliott, Mark C. “Manchu Widows and Ethnicity in Qing China.” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 41, no. 1 
(1999): 33-71. 
 
Giquel, Prosper, and Steven A Leibo. A Journal of the Chinese 
Civil War, 1864. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1985. 
 
Hase, P.H. “A Song From Sha Tauk Kok on the 1911 
Revolution.”Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong 
Kong Branch 29 (1989): 382-384. 
 
______“Heir Apparent Whipped.” Los Angeles, xxviii, no. 102. 
(January 11, 1901). Accessed November 10, 2014. 
California Digital Newspaper Collection. 
http://cdnc.ucr.edu. 
 
Koo, V.K. Wellington. The Lytton Commission vol. III. New York: 
The Chinese Cultural Society, New York City, 1933.  
 
______“Manchus in Desperate Stand at Canton.” San Francisco 
Call 110, no. 154. (November 1, 1911). Accessed 
November 15, 2014. California Digital Newspaper 
Collection. http://cdnc.ucr.edu. 
 
Michael, Franz. The Origin of Manchu Rule in China: Frontier 
and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese 
Empire. New York: Octagon Books, 1972. 
 
Mitter, Rana. Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and 
Collaboration During the Manchurian Crisis, 1931-1933. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 
 
Hannah Knight 
 
 
137 
 
_______”No Place for Manchus Say Chinese Leaders.” San 
Francisco Call 111, no. 51 (January 20, 1912). California 
Digital Newspaper Collection. http://cdnc.ucr.edu. 
 
Peffer, Nathaniel. “Monarchists Plots have China Seething.” New 
York Tribune. (August 14, 1921). Accessed November 21, 
2014. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov. 
 
Rawski, Evelyn S. “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: 
The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History.” 
The Journal of Asian Studies, 55, no. 4 (1996): 829-850 
 
Rea, George Bronson. The Case For Manchukuo. New York:
 D. Appleton-Century Company Incorporated, 1936. 
 
Rhoads, Edward J. Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and
 Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China,
 1861-1928. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000. 
 
Rowe, William. China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2009. 
 
______”School Closed Until Monday, April 2.” Cosair 5, no. 23. 
(March 14 1934). Accessed November 20, 2014.  
California Digital Newspaper Collection. 
http://cdnc.ucr.edu 
 
Struve, Lynn A. Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in 
Tiger’s Jaws. Birmingham, New York. Vail-Ballou Press, 
1944. 
 
Vanderbilt Jr., Cornelius. “China Warfare is seen Due to Hate For 
Japs.” The Washington Times.  May 3, 1922. Accessed 
December 6, 2014. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov. 
 
Manchus: A Horse of a Different Color 
 
 
138
 
Young, Louise. Twentieth Century Japan: The Emergence of a 
World Power, Volume 8: Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria 
and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998 
 
Zarrow, Peter Gue. After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation 
of the Chinese State, 1885-1924. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012. 
 
Zhao, Gang. “Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the
 Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early
 Twentieth Century.” Modern China, 32, no. 1 (2006): 3-30. 
 
______. Sino-Japanese Entanglements, 1931-1932: (A
 Military Record). Tokyo: The Herald Press, 1932. 
  
 
Hannah Knight 
 
 
139 
Author Bio 
 
Hannah Knight is a recent graduate from California State 
University, San Bernardino with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 
History with interests lying in European and Asian History. Her 
goal is to continue her education at CSUSB by entering their 
Single Subject Credential Program in the summer of 2015. 
Following the completion of her credential, Hannah’s goal is to 
teach world history at the high school level. She hopes to one day 
have the chance to travel the world so that she may be able see the 
places that have been such a large part of her life. The list of 
people she is most grateful to is extensive but there are a few key 
individuals who have played a vital role in her success. She would 
like to thank Dr. Murray and Dr. Blackey from the history 
department at CSUSB. Dr. Blackey who introduced her to the 
world of European history with HIST 306 and Dr. Murray who 
played a key role in the development of this paper. To Amanda 
Codeus who played the part of editor of many papers and friend 
throughout their time at CSUSB. Most importantly her family; they 
were her editors, sounding board, support system, prayer group, 
and source of an endless supply of love. 
 
